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A b s tra c t. We present a case study in the formal verification of an open 
source Java implementation of SSH. We discuss the security flaws we 
found and fixed by means of formal specification and verification -  us­
ing the specification language JML and the program verification tool 
ESC/Java2 -  and by more basic manual code inspection. Of more gen­
eral interest is the methodology we propose to formalise security proto­
cols such as SSH using finite state machines. This provides a precise but 
accessible formal specification, that is not only useful for formal verifi­
cation, but also for development, testing, and for clarification of official 
specification in natural language.
1 In trodu ction
The past decade has seen great progress in the field of formal analysis of secu­
rity  protocols. However, there has been little work or progress on verifying actual 
im plem entations of security protocols. Still, th is is an im portan t issue, because 
bugs can make an im plem entation of a secure protocol completely insecure. A 
fundam ental challenge here is posed by the big gaps between (i) the  official spec­
ification of a security protocol, typically in n a tu ra l language; (ii) any models of 
(parts of) the  protocol developed for formal verification of security properties, 
e.g. using model checking; and (iii) actual im plem entations of the  protocol. In an 
effort to  bridge these gaps, we perform ed a case study  in the formal specification 
and verification of a Java im plem entation of SSH. We considered an existing 
im plem entation, M IDP-SSH3, which is an actively m aintained open source im ­
plem entation for use on Java-enabled mobile phones. M IDP-SSH is a typical 
im plem entation in the sense th a t it is not w ritten  from scratch bu t based on an 
earlier one, re-using code from a variety of sources.
In order to  express the  properties to  be verified for the source code, we used 
the Java M odeling Language (JM L) [9]. JM L is a specification language designed 
to  describe properties of Java program s. It supports all the  im portan t features of 
the Java language e.g. inheritance, subtyping, exceptions etc. JM L is supported  
by a range of tools for dynam ic or sta tic  checking; for an overview see [2]. We used 
the extended sta tic  checker E S C /Java2  [3], the successor of E S C /Java  [4]. This
* Supported by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU under the MOBIUS 
project FP6-015905.
** Supported by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU under the SOJOURN 
project MEIF-CT-2005-024306.
3 Available from http://www.xk72.com /m idpssh/.
tool tries to  verify autom atically  JM L -annotated  source code, using a weakest 
precondition calculus and an au tom ated  theorem  prover.
The structure o f the paper Section 2 describes the informal code inspection 
carried out as first stage of our analysis, and Section 3 describes the more formal 
approach taken after th a t. Section 1.1 below presents an overview of the  approach 
taken in these two stages. We draw our conclusions and discuss possible future 
work in Section 4.
1.1 M e th o d o lo g y
After considering the security requirem ents of the  application, our analysis of 
the im plem entation proceeded in several steps.
The first stage, described in Section 2, was an ad-hoc m anual inspection of 
the source code. We familiarised ourselves w ith the design of the application, 
considered which p arts  of the code are security-sensitive, and looked for possible 
weaknesses. This led to  discovery of some common m istakes -  or a t least bad 
practices which should be avoided in security-sensitive applications.
The next stage, described in Section 3, involved the use of the  formal spec­
ification language JM L and the program  verification tool E SC /Java2 . Here we 
can distinguish two steps:
— The first step, discussed in Section 3.1, was the stan d ard  one when us­
ing ESC /Java2: we used the tool to  verify th a t the im plem entation does 
not throw  any runtim e exceptions. For instance, the  im plem entation might 
throw  an A rraylndexO utO fB oundsException due to  incorrect handling of 
some m alform ed d a ta  packet it receives. This step revealed some bugs in the 
im plem entation, where sanity  checks on well-formedness of the d a ta  packets 
received were not properly carried out. This would only allow a DoS attack, 
by m aking the SSH client crash on such a m alform ed packet. O f course, 
for an im plem entation in a type-unsafe language such as C, as opposed to  
Java, these bugs would be much more serious, as poten tia l sources of buffer 
overflow attacks.
The process of using E S C /Java2  to  verify th a t no runtim e exceptions can 
occur, incl. the  process of adding the JM L annotations th is requires, forces 
one to  thoroughly inspect and understand  the code. As a side effect of this 
we already spo tted  one serious security flaw in the im plem entation.
— The next step, discussed in Section 3.2, was to  verify th a t the Java code 
correctly im plem ents the SSH protocol as officially specified in RFCs 4250­
4254 [16,14,17,15]. This required some formal specification of SSH. For this 
we developed our own formal specification of SSH, in the form of a finite 
s ta te  m achine (FSM) which describes how the s ta te  of the  protocol changes 
in response to  the  different messages it can receive. This is of course only 
a partial specification, as it specifies the order of messages bu t not their 
precise form at. Still, it tu rned  out to  be interesting enough, as we hope to 
dem onstrate in th is paper.
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This last step of the  verification is probably the m ost interesting. Firstly, we 
found th a t obtaining the  finite s ta te  machine from the n a tu ra l language de­
scription in the RFCs was far from trivial, and it revealed some am biguities 
and unclarities. I t is not always clear w hat the response to  an unexpected, 
unsupported  or simply m alform ed message should be: some of these may or 
should be ignored bu t others m ust lead to  disconnection. Secondly, verify­
ing th a t the im plem entation m eets this partia l specification as given by the 
FSM  revealed some serious security flaws in the  im plem entation. In particu ­
lar, the  im plem entation is vulnerable to  a m an-in-the-m iddle attack, where 
an attacker can request the  usernam e and password of the  user before any 
au thentication  has taken place and before a session key has been established. 
A secure im plem entation should of course never handle such a request.
2 Stage 1: Inform al, ad-hoc analysis
Prior to  any system atic analysis of the application as discussed in the  next 
section, we read the security analysis of the SSH protocol provided in the RFCs 
[16]. T hen we extended the  analysis to  cover the issues closely related  to  the 
Java program m ing language and to  the Java M IDP platform . We located the 
p a rt of the source code which directly im plem ents the protocol and tried  to 
relate the results of the  security analysis to  the source code, bu t w ithout try ing 
to  understand  the logic of the im plem entation. In the  course of these steps, we 
already spo tted  some (potential) security problem s. Here is a description of the 
m ost im portan t ones:
W ea k/n o  authentication  The SSH client does not store public key inform ation 
for subsequent sessions: it will connect to  any site and simply ask th a t site 
for its public keys, w ithout checking th is against earlier runs and asking the 
user to  accept a new or changed public key. In o ther words, there is no real 
au thentication  before sta rting  an SSH session. This is especially strange as the 
application stores certain session related inform ation (i.e. host name, user name, 
and even password) in the M ID P perm anent storage -  record stores.
There is a counterm easure th a t allows the user to  au then ticate  the  server 
she or he is connecting to: the  SSH client displays an MD5 hash of the server’s 
public key as ‘fingerprint’ of the server it connects to. The user can check to  see 
if th is MD5 hash has the right value. O f course, the  typical user will not check 
this.
Note th a t unau then tica ted  key exchange is a well-known and common secu­
rity  mistake; it is for instance listed in [6]. This highlights the im portance th a t 
program m ers are aware of such common mistakes!
Poor use o f Java access restrictions The im plem entation does not make optim al 
use of the  possibilities th a t Java offers to  restrict access to  data , w ith the visibility 
modifiers, such as p u b l ic  and p r iv a te ,  and the  modifier f i n a l  to  make fields 
im m utable.
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For instance, the  im plem entation creates an instance of the standard  library 
class ja v a .la n g .R a n d o m  for random  num ber generation. The reference to  this 
object is stored in a public s ta tic  field rnd . U ntrusted  code could simply modify 
this field, so th a t it for instance points to  an instance of jav a .lan g .R an d o m  
w ith a known seed, or to  an instance of some completely bogus subclass of 
jav a .lan g .R an d o m  which does not produce random  num bers a t all. The field 
rn d  should be p r iv a t e  or f i n a l  -  or, b e tte r still, bo th  -  to  rule out such 
tam pering.
In all fairness, we should point out th a t for the  current version of the M IDP 
platform  the th rea t of some hostile application attacking the SSH client by chang­
ing its public fields is not realistic. A restriction of the  M ID P platform  is th a t 
at m ost one application -  or m idlet, as applications for the  M ID P platform  are 
called -  is running at the  same tim e, so a hostile application cannot be execut­
ing concurrently w ith the SSH m idlet. Moreover, each tim e the SSH client is 
s ta rted  it will initialise its fields from scratch. Still, such restrictions are likely 
to  be loosened in the  future, and the  code of M IDP-SSH m ight be re-used in 
applications for o ther Java platform s where these restrictions do not apply.
A sim ilar problem  occurs w ith the storage of the contents of P- and S-boxes 
in the im plem entation. The class Blowfish in the  im plem entation uses an array
final static int[] blowfish_sbox = { 0xd1310ba6, ... };
This integer array is final, so cannot be modified. However, the content of the 
array is still modifiable. The field has default package visibility, which gives 
ra ther weak restrictions about who can modify is, as explained in [10], so hostile 
code could modify the S-boxes used by the SSH client, and a t least create a DoS 
attack . The field should really be private and there is no reason why it cannot be. 
Again, for the  M IDP platform  th is is not really a th rea t, due to  its restrictions 
discussed above.
Checking if access modifiers can be tightened need not be done manually, bu t 
can be autom ated, for instance using JA M IT 4. The problem s in the application 
suggest th a t system atic use of such a tool would be worthwhile.
C ontrol characters One of the security th rea ts  m entioned in the security analy­
sis is the scenario when a malicious party  sends a stream  of control characters 
which erases certain  messages to  lure the  user into perform ing an insecure ac­
tion. A lthough the SSH client does in terp ret some control characters, there is 
no operation  to  ensure th a t only safe control sequences appear on the u ser’s 
term inal.
Downloading o f the session in form ation  The application im plem ents function­
ality to  download a description of an SSH session to  execute. Such a description 
can contain the inform ation about the user and a host name. The transfer of 
such inform ation over the network in cleartext is an obvious compromise of the 
security as th ird  parties can associate the login w ith the machine. Moreover,
4 See h t tp : / /g r o th o f f .o r g /c h r is t ia n /x tc / ja m it /
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data  downloaded in th is way is not displayed to  the  user who dem anded it. In 
this way it is easy to  realize a spoofing a ttack  which forwards the  user to  a fake 
SSH server which steals the  password.
3 Form al, sy stem atic  analysis using JM L and E S C /Java2
The analysis using more formal m ethods consisted of two stages. The first stage 
was to  verify th a t the  im plem entation does not throw  any runtim e exceptions, 
e.g. due to  null pointers, bad type casts, or accesses outside array bounds. The 
second one was to  (partially) specify SSH, by m eans of a finite s ta te  machine, 
and verify th a t the  im plem entation correctly im plem ents th is behaviour.
3.1  S ta g e  2: E x c e p tio n  F reen ess
The standard  first step in using E S C /Java2  is to  check th a t the  program  does 
not produce any runtim e exceptions. Indeed, often th is is the only property  one 
checks for the  code. A lthough it is a relatively weak property, verifying it can 
reveal quite a num ber of bugs and can expose m any im plicit assum ptions in 
the code. Ju s t establishing exception freeness requires the  form alisation of m any 
properties about the  code, as JM L preconditions, invariants, and sometimes 
postconditions. For instance, invariants th a t certain  reference fields cannot be 
null are needed to  rule out N ullPointerExceptions, and invariants th a t certain 
integer fields are not negative or have some m axim um  value are needed to  rule 
out A rrayIndexO utO fBoundsExceptions.
Like any verification w ith E SC /Java2 , checking the absence of exceptions 
relies on the axiom atisation of Java sem antics built into the  tool and on spec­
ifications of any A PIs used, e.g. for library  calls such as S y stem .a rray co p y , 
which are given in a s tan d ard  set of files w ith JM L specifications for core API 
classes. Correctness of the  results of E S C /Java2  relies on the correctness of this 
axiom atisation and these API specifications.
Trying to  check th a t no runtim e exceptions occur w ith E S C /Java2  revealed 
some bugs in the  im plem entation, nam ely missing sanity  checks on the well- 
formedness of the  d a ta  packets before these packets are processed. This means 
th a t the SSH client could crash w ith an A rrayIndexO utO fB oundsException 
when receiving certain  m alform ed packets. Such Denial-of-Service attacks are 
discussed in the RCFs.
The process of using E S C /Java2  to  check th a t no runtim e exceptions can 
occur -  incl. the  adding of all the  JM L annotations th is requires -  forces one to 
thoroughly inspect and understand  the code. As a side effect of this we spo tted  a 
serious security weakness in the  im plem entation, nam ely th a t it does not check 
the MAC of the incoming messages, so it is vulnerable to  certain  replay attacks.
The whole process of proving exception freeness, including fixing the code 
where required, took about two weeks.
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3.2  S ta g e  3: P r o to c o l sp ec if ica tio n  and  v er ifica tio n
In addition to  ju s t proving th a t the im plem entation does not throw  runtim e 
exceptions, we also w anted to  verify th a t it is a correct im plem entation of the 
client side of the  SSH protocol, as specified in the RFCs. This requires some 
formal specification of SSH, of course.
Form al sp ec ifica tio n  o f  SSH  as F S M  U nfortunately  we could not find any 
formal description of SSH in the literature; the  only formal description we could 
find [12] only deals w ith a p a rt of the whole SSH protocol. Therefore we developed 
our own formal specification of SSH, in the form of a finite sta te  m achine (FSM) 
which describes how the sta te  of the protocol changes in response to  the different 
messages it can receive. This is of course only a partial specification, as it only 
specifies the order of messages bu t not their precise form at. Still, th is partia l 
spec was interesting enough, as we hope to  dem onstrate in th is paper.
K E X I N I T ?
O  D ISCONNECTED| C O N N E C T !
O W AIT.VERSIO N
V E R S I O N ?
o  VERSION .RECEIVED
V E R S IO N !
O  W A IT .K E X IN IT
K E X I N I T ?
o  KEXIN IT .R ECEIVED
K E X I N I T !
o  K E X IN IT .S E N T
K E X D H -I N I T !
O  W AIT_KEXDH_REPLY | K E X D H -R E P L Y ?
O WAITJMEW KEYS| N E W  K E Y S ?
O  NEW KEYS-RECEIVED
N E W  K E Y S !
'O  CO M M U NICATIO N
Fig. 1. A simplified view of the FSM specifying the behaviour of the SSH client, without 
optional features described in the RFCs that are not supported, and ignoring the 
aspects described in Fig. 3. The names of the transitions are the same names used in 
the RFCs. Labels ending with ! are outputs of the client to the server, labels ending 
with ? denote inputs to the client.
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It tu rn s  out th a t the SSH protocol involves about 15 kinds of messages and 
its session key negotiation phase has about 20 different sta tes. One complication 
in defining an FSM  describing the client side behaviour of the protocol is th a t 
the SSH specifications present the  protocol as a set of features which are partly  
obligatory and partly  optional. A FSM  th a t includes all these optional p arts  is 
given in Fig. 2. For simplicity, we focused our a tten tion  on those p a rts  of the  pro­
tocol th a t this particu lar im plem entation actually  supports. This simplifies the 
overall behaviour, nam ely to  th a t shown in Fig. 1. This behaviour corresponds 
to  the  left-m ost branch in the full specification of SSH given in Fig. 2.
Fig. 1 not only ignores options not im plem ented, bu t also includes an ap­
parently  common choice m ade in the im plem entation th a t is left open by the 
official specification. Section 4.2 of [17] states: “ W hen the connection has been 
established, both sides M U ST  send an identification string”. This specifies th a t 
b o th  client and server m ust send an identification string, b u t does not specify 
the order in which they do this. In principle, it is possible for b o th  sides to 
wait for the  o ther to  send the  identification string  first, leading to  deadlock. The 
M IDP-SSH im plem entation chooses to  let the  client wait for an identification 
string  from the  server (the transition  VER SIO N ?  in Fig. 1) before replying w ith 
an identification string  (the subsequent transition  V E R SIO N !). This appears to 
be the standard  way of im plem enting this: OpenSSH makes the same choice. In 
fact, an earlier specification of SSH 1.5 [13, Overview of the  Protocol] does pre­
scribe th is order; it is not clear to  us why the newer specification [17] does not. 
Moreover, it is not clear if th is is a deliberate underspecification or a mistake. Of 
course, one of the  benefits of formalising specifications is th a t such issues come 
to light.
Fig. 1 does not tell the  whole story, though. It only specifies the standard , 
correct sequence of messages, bu t does not specify how the client should react to 
unexpected, unsupported , or simply m alform ed messages. This is where much 
of the  com plication lies: some of these messages m ay  or should be ignored, bu t 
others m u st  lead to  disconnection. Adding all the transitions for this to  Fig. 1, 
(or, worse still to  Fig. 2) would lead to  a very com plicated FSM  th a t is hard  to 
draw or understand, and very easy to  get wrong. We therefore chose to  specify 
these aspects in a separate FSM, given in Fig. 3.
The SSH specification sta tes th a t after the protocol version is negotiated, 
i.e. from the sta te  WAIT_KEXINIT onwards, the  client should always be able 
to  handle a few messages in a generic way. Some of these messages should be 
completely ignored; some should lead to  an U N IM P LEM EN TED ! reply, m eaning 
the client does not support th is message; some should lead to  disconnection. This 
aspect is specified in a separate FSM: in the  s ta te  WAIT_KEXINIT and any later 
state, the client should im plem ent the additional transitions given in Fig. 3.
In Fig. 3 we use a few additional ad-hoc conventions to  keep the diagram  read­
able. F O R E I G N - M S G S ?  stands for any message th a t is not explicitly known 
by the  application. As noted  above, all such messages should trigger the  sending 
of the  U N IM PLEM EN TED  message. Similarly, O T H E R _ K N O W N _ M S G S ?  
stands for any message th a t is known, bu t arrived in a wrong sta te  -  these
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Fig. 2. Specification of the full client side behaviour of SSH, including all optional 
features. This diagram must still be extended with the additional aspects as given by 
the diagrams in Fig. 3. [NB the diagram, above have been corrected and simplified from, 
the original W IT S’07 publication.]
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DISCONNECT?
UNIMPLEMENl
iNNECTED
V i v m a r  u n i v i e j i \  i  a u  ? r jz ?D rr/ '*< ?  ±KJ1'DEBUG?
Fig. 3. Additional possible transitions from WAIT_KEXINIT onwards. X stands for any 
state from WAIT_KEXINIT onwards.
messages lead to  disconnection. This diagram  is still a simplification because 
in some sta tes certain  known messages should be ignored ra ther th an  lead to 
disconnection, bu t we do not have space to  discuss these details here.
A nother ad-hoc convention are the labels SshException?  and IOException?. 
These transitions represent two exceptional situations th a t can occur. Firstly, 
there is the  possibility of an IO error (e.g. because the network or the server 
goes down), which is modelled by the IO Exception?  transition . Secondly, there 
is the  possibility th a t the  incoming packet is of a known type bu t fails to  m eet the 
form at specified in the  RFCs (e.g. the value of the  length field exceeds the  size 
of the packet, or the  MAC is incorrect), which is modelled by the SshException?  
transition . As you may have guessed, the nam es of these transitions are inspired 
the Java exceptions used in the  im plem entation.
D iscussion  The finite sta te  machines specifying SSH are im plicit in the natu ra l 
language specifications given in the  RFCs, bu t were not so easy to  ex tract, and 
highlighted some unclarities. We already m entioned the issue th a t description of 
the order of certain  messages from client to  server and back can be in terpreted  
in several ways.
W hereas the  nam es of various types of messages are well-standardised, and 
we use these in our diagram s, there is no explicit notion of sta te  in the SSH 
specifications. So the nam es of the sta tes in the diagram s are our invention. This 
lack of an explicit notion of s ta te  is a source of unclarity  in the specification. In 
particular, [16, Sect. 9.3.5] asserts:
If transm ission errors or message m anipulation occur, the connection is 
closed. The connection SHOULD be re-established if th is occurs.
bu t it is hard  to  figure out which messages should be regarded as message m anip­
ulation at a given stage. The RFCs specify forbidden messages in several places, 
e.g. in [17, Sect. 7.1], e.g.
Once a party  has sent a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT message [ .. .] ,  until it has 
sent a SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS message (Section 7.3), it M UST NOT send 
any messages o ther than: [. . . ]
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bu t it is not obvious th a t messages o ther th an  those listed should be considered 
as ‘m anipulations’ a t th is stage.
It would be b e tte r if the  inform ation about which messages are allowed, can 
be ignored, or m ust lead to  disconnection in a given sta te  is available in a more 
structu red  way. Now th is inform ation is spread out over several places in the 
RFCs. An alternative to  using FSM s m ight simply be a table of sta tes and 
messages.
A nother source of unclarity  is the way the stan d ard  keywords are used in 
the specifications. There is an IE T F  stan d ard  which precisely defines the  pre­
cise m eaning of term s such as ‘M U ST’, ‘MAY’, ‘REC O M M EN D ED ’, and ‘O P ­
TIO N A L’ [1], bu t the  SSH specification is not consistent in using these keywords. 
For example, [17, Section 4] says
Key exchange w ill begin im m ediately after sending th is identifier.
which presum ably m eans th a t it ‘M U ST’ (and th a t any other behaviour ‘M U ST’ 
be considered as m anipulation and lead to  disconnection?).
Finally, in [17, Section 6] we noted th a t it is not clear if a well-formed packet 
may have a zero-length payload section or if such a packet should always be 
trea ted  as malformed, because it is impossible to  determ ine its type, which is 
crucial for any handling of the  packet. (The specification does not forbid such 
packets, bu t for instance OpenSSH trea ts  them  as an error and quits the client).
3.3  V erifica tio n  o f  M ID P -S S H
Before we even a ttem p ted  a formal verification th a t the  M IDP-SSH correctly 
im plem ents the  specification as given by the FSMs, it was easy to  see th a t the 
im plem entation was not correct: it did not correctly record the protocol state, 
and it accepted and processed m any messages which following the FSM s should 
lead to  disconnection. The prim e example of th is was th a t a request for usernam e 
and password would be processed by the SSH client in any state.
Therefore we improved the im plem entation before a ttem pting  formal verifi­
cation: we re-factored the code so the handling of each message was done by a 
separate m ethod, we improved the  recording of the protocol sta te , and we added 
case distinctions based on the protocol s ta te  to  obtain  the right behaviour in 
each state.
To verify th a t the  software correctly im plem ented the finite s ta te  machine, 
we then  used A utoJM L 5 [7], a tool th a t generates JM L specifications (or Java 
code) from finite s ta te  machines. This tool had to  be adapted  to  cope w ith our 
use of several s ta te  diagram s to  express various aspects of the behaviour, i.e. w ith 
Fig 3 expressing aspects of the  behaviour th a t should be added to  the  overall 
behaviour in Fig. 1. (The alternative would have been to  draw the very large 
finite sta te  m achine th a t would result from adding these aspects to  the overall 
behaviour in Fig. 1.)
5 Available from h ttp ://a u to jm l.so u rc e fo rg e .n e t
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We added the specifications generated by A utoJM L to the source code and 
verified them  using E SC /Java2 . This revealed there were still errors in the (al­
ready improved) im plem entation, where certain  m ethods handled incoming mes­
sages in a different way th an  prescribed by the FSM. Even though we were aware 
th a t the handling of exceptions is a delicate m a tte r and paid particu lar a tten ­
tion to  this, we still missed updates to  the in ternal s ta te  variable in certain  cases 
when the exceptions were thrown.
4 C onclusions
Now th a t there are various m atu re  tools available to  verify security properties 
of abstrac t security protocols, we believe it is tim e to  tackle the  next challenge, 
nam ely try ing to  verify the  security of real im plem entations of such protocols.
This paper reports on an experim ent to  see if and how formal m ethods -  
in particu lar formal specification using finite s ta te  machines, the  specification 
language JM L, and the  program  checker E S C /Java2  -  can be used for to  verify 
an existing Java im plem entation of SSH. In the end, we m anaged to  verify the 
im plem entation in the sense th a t it never throw s an exception (which is m aybe 
more a safety property  th an  a security property) and th a t it correctly im plem ents 
the SSH protocol as specified by finite s ta te  machines th a t we developed as 
form alisation of the official SSH specifications. Along the  way we found and 
fixed several security flaws in the  code. Some of these were found as a direct 
consequence of the  verification, some were found more as a side-effect of having 
to  thoroughly inspect and anno ta te  the code to  get it to  verify. Using of an 
extended sta tic  checker such as E S C /Java2  is a way to  force a very thorough 
code inspection.
A general conclusion about our case study  is th a t a formal specification of a 
security protocol th a t captures all or a t least m ost of the  complexities in some 
form at th a t is readable to  im plem entors is very useful. Given the  complexity 
of real-life protocols, it is easy to  get som ething wrong, as w itnessed by the 
im plem entation we looked at. The specification of SSH as a finite sta te  machine 
is formal, bu t still easy to  understand  by non-experts. (We are investigating 
o ther notations to  use instead of finite s ta te  machines -  more on th a t below.) 
We believe th a t providing such a description as p a rt of official specification would 
be valuable, as it clarifies the  specification and is also useful for development. 
Indeed, note th a t anyone who im plem ents SSH will, as p a rt of the  work, have to 
im plem ent a finite s ta te  m achine th a t is described in the  prose of the SSH RFCs 
and hence will have to  re-do much of the  work th a t we have done in coming up 
w ith the description of SSH as finite s ta te  machine.
The size of the SSH code we verified (just the  code for the protocol, excluding 
the code for the GUI etc.) is around 4.5 kloc. The whole verification effort took 
about 6 weeks, including the tim e it took to  understand  and formalise the  SSH 
specs, which was about 2 weeks. For widely used im plem entations of security 
protocols, say the  im plem entation of SSL in the Java API, such an effort might 
be considered acceptable.
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The second stage in our approach, ensuring the  absence of runtim e excep­
tions, can catch program m ing errors in the handling of individual messages, 
especially m alform ed ones. The th ird  stage, verification of conformance to  the 
FSM, can catch program m ing errors in the handling of sequences of messages, 
especially incorrect ones. Note th a t th is complements conventional testing: te s t­
ing -  or, indeed, norm al use of the application -  is likely to  reveal bugs in the 
handling of correctly form atted  messages and correct sequences of such mes­
sages, bu t is less likely to  reveal bugs in the handling of incorrectly form atted 
messages or incorrect sequences of messages, simply due to  the  lim itless num ber 
of possibilities for this. So our approach may detect errors th a t are hard  to  find 
using testing.
A more practical issue is w hat the  m ost convenient formalism or form at for 
such finite s ta te  machines is, and which tools can be used to  develop them . We 
developed our diagram s on paper and w hiteboards, bu t w ith large num ber of 
arrows th is becomes very cumbersome w ithout some ad-hoc conventions and 
abbreviations. M aybe a purely graphical language is not the  m ost convenient in 
the long run. Given the com plexity of a real-life protocols, some way of separating  
different aspects in different finite s ta te  machines (as we have done w ith Fig. 1 
describing the  ‘norm al’ scenario and Fig. 3 describing ‘o th e r’ scenarios) seems 
im portan t.
Related work An earlier paper [7] already investigated how a provably correct 
im plem entation could be obtained from an abstrac t security protocol for a very 
simple protocol. The A utoJM L tool we used to  produce JM L specifications from 
the finite s ta te  machines can also produce a skeleton Java im plem entation. W hen 
developing an im plem entation for SSH from scratch, ra th e r th an  exam ining an 
existing one as we did, th is approach m ight be preferable. There are already 
efforts to  generate code from abstrac t protocol descriptions, e.g. to  generate 
Java code from security protocols described in the Spi calculus [11], or to  refine 
abstrac t s ta te  m achine (ASM) specifications to  Java code [5].
Jiirjens in [8] showed how to verify the security of UML models of security 
related  protocols. These UML models are on the level of abstraction  sim ilar to 
the one employed by us in FSMs.
Future work I t would be interesting to  repeat the experim ent we have done 
for o ther im plem entations and for o ther protocols, i.e. try ing  to  formalise other 
protocols using FSM s or o ther formalisms, and using these to  check im plem en­
tations. Of course, for an im plem entation th a t is not in Java, bu t say in C or 
C + + , we m ight not have program  checkers like E SC /Java2 . Still, a form alisation 
of a security protocol is not only useful for program  verification, bu t also as aid 
to  the  im plem entor, as aid for a hum an code inspection and for testing. Indeed, 
m odel-based testing  could be used to  test if an im plem entation of SSH conforms 
to  our formal specification of the  protocol.
In the  end we only verified th a t the code correctly im plem ents the  protocol 
as described by the finite s ta te  machine, not th a t th is protocol is secure, i.e. 
th a t it ensures authentication, integrity  and confidentiality. Verifying th a t the
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full SSH protocol as described in Fig. 2 m eets its security goals still seems an 
interesting challenge to  the  security protocol verification community.
As an alternative to  using finite s ta te  machines, we are currently  experi­
m enting w ith a no tation  th a t is similar to  the  stan d ard  form at used to  describe 
security protocols, bu t extended w ith branching and jum p statem ents. This then 
allows us not only to  specify the norm al protocol run, bu t also how any deviations 
from the norm al protocol run  have to  be handled. Such a formalism may be more 
practical no tation  th an  a graphical one such as finite s ta te  machines, which can 
become unwieldy, and has the advantage of being closer to  conventional formal 
no tation  for security protocols.
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